Review of \u3ci\u3eThe Civil Rights Injunction\u3c/i\u3e by Owen M. Fiss by Rendleman, Doug
The Civil Rights Injunction. OWEN M. Fiss. Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1978. Pp. vi, 117. $10.95.
Doug Rendlemant
Owen Fiss's terse, insightful study adds a new dimension to our
understanding of that elusive quality, equity. Fiss has written a
provocative and stimulating study of one of the law's basic compo-
nents. I will begin with a warning: the work's short length belies its
heft. I began to read thinking that I would finish the entire book in
one sitting, but after two hours, I found that I had taken so much
time to reread passages and evaluate previously unexamined prem-
ises that I had completed less than twenty-five pages.
Infused with the spirit of liberalism and judicial activism, Fiss
attempts to reunite injunctions with fundamental notions of equity
and rehabilitate the injunction as a remedy. The author reminds us
first that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century judges
granted many injunctions to suppress organized labor.1 Injunctions
became associated with heavy-handed government by a conserva-
tive judiciary, 2 and observers began to identify injunctions with the
substantive assertions of management and the interests they
served. 3 Frankfurter and Greene's book, The Labor Injunction,4
focused the nation's attention on the way a business-oriented
judiciary abused the injunctive remedy to defeat labor.'
During the depression the political climate for labor changed;
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,6 taking the federal judi-
ciary out of the labor-injunction business, 7 and newly appointed
federal judges became more attuned to the aspirations of the com-
mon people. Frankfurter and Greene had succeeded in persuading
the New Deal generation of the desirability of restricted use of in-
junctions.8 With Brown v. Board of Education II,1 however, injunc-
tions became associated with the civil rights movement, because in
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that case the Court ordered the federal courts to "be guided by
equitable principles"'0 in dismantling segregated education. The
injunction then seemed to many an instrument of a moral impera-
tive to vindicate the compelling demand for racial justice.
The Civil Rights Injunction develops two major themes. One of
these is centered on Fiss's assertion that a hierarchy of remedies
exists in which injunctions are considered a disfavored remedy."
Judges grant injunctions, Fiss explains, only when the plaintiff's
injury is irreparable, when other remedies are inadequate.' 2 Fiss
contends that once we divorce the injunction from its historical
substantive contexts and compare it with equivalent legal instru-
ments such as criminal statutes and tort liability rules,13 the injunc-
tion cannot be considered solely a remedy of last resort. All reme-
dies, he concludes, hould be considered of potentially equal appli-
cability, and judges should award the best remedy available under
the circumstances.' 4
Fiss's other chief contention concerns the long-accepted view
that injunctions are of two varieties, labeled by some as interlocu-
tory or final, and by others as mandatory or prohibitory. Fiss argues
that there are in reality three related but discrete subspecies of the
beast injunction subsisting side by side. 5 The first is the traditional
preventive injunction,' 6 a personalized interdiction grounded in con-
ventional doctrine. It forbids a losing litigant to trespass, infringe
the copyright, or dig the canal, and it threatens criminal contempt
as the sanction for violation. Next, Fiss discusses the reparative
injunction; 7 it directs the miscreant who has done something wrong
to cease, and possibly also to do it over, but correctly this time.'8
Fiss refers to this type of remedy as compensation in kind,'9 or as
an in-kind damage judgment.2 Finally, Fiss identifies and describes
a third type of injunction, which he terms the structural injunc-
tion.2'
Naming the structural injunction and articulating some of its
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general characteristics are Fiss's major contributions to our continu-
ing effort to understand equity. Judges use structural injunctions to
reorganize existing governmental institutions, such as schools, men-
tal hospitals, and prisons, because they find that the ways the au-
thorities operate the institutions violate the Constitution. 2  Struc-
tural injunctions differ fundamentally from other types of injunc-
tions. The in-kind damage awards associated with reparative in-
junctions are necessarily inadequate in these situations. Citizens are
entitled as an original matter, for example, to enjoy a unitary school
system, to be treated when institutionally committed, or to be free
of cruel and unusual punishment.23 Furthermore, unlike preliminary
injunctions or temporary restraining orders, 2 structural injunctions
almost never spring full-blown into being without notice and a hear-
ing. Indeed, they are issued in conjunction with protracted hearings,
detailed findings, and multiple submissions of plans.2 This proce-
dural aspect of structural injunctions is responsible for much of
their uniqueness.
Granting and administering structural injunctions calls upon
trial judges to exercise almost superhuman powers. Classes seeking
injunctive relief are often massive and often comprised of people
unable either to speak articulately for themselves or to choose able
representatives. Intervenors and amici clamor for attention. Judges
must sense unarticulated possibilities and possess the judgment to
marshal responsible public opinion. To channel information and
observe performance, judges create ancillary bureaucracies of mas-
ters, monitors, and councils. If the enterprise is to prosper, the judge
will form at least a tacit emotional and intellectual alliance with the
spending and taxing power which must provide the wherewithal.26
The process perforce threatens the judge's impersonal and passive
posture, and judge as umpire loses to judge as catalyst or manager.27
As Fiss felicitously remarks in another context, "It was not reason-
able to expect the judges to be heroes, but the truth of the matter
is that many lived up to these unreasonable expectations. .. .
The process of enforcing a structural injunction develops the
continuity of an extended relation, because the relationship be-
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tween the judge and the parties is consultative rather than adver-
sarial. Structural injunctions are seldom enforced with either crimi-
nal or truly coercive contempt,"2 for example, because judges seek-
ing to secure cooperation sense that throwing a school board mem-
ber into gaol may not be the best way to improve conditions in the
schools. Accordingly, plaintiffs move for supplemental relief, and
defendants move to dissolve, modify, or clarify; but no one mentions
contempt, for that would be bad form. The judge and the plaintiff
want to co-opt the defendant and induce him to collaborate. They
may come around to contempt after a long period of trying other
measures, but a punitive contempt fine or a sentence of imprison-
ment (or for that matter, any immediately coercive tactic) would
surprise observers. People who wish to work with others in the future
wisely avoid the false Carthaginian peace of total victory and com-
plete submission which exacerbates tensions and prevents meaning-
ful give and take in the future.
Fiss's examination of structural injunctions does more than
merely explain existing practices. By focusing on the unique proce-
dural framework of the structural injunction, Fiss compels us to look
again at traditional procedure, the judicial process, the adversary
system, and the role of the judge. Cast in the traditional mold of
contentious, self-contained, bipolar, and retrospective litigation,
much procedure is anachronistic in the sprawling, future-oriented,
multi-faceted environment of structural litigation. 0
Indeed, one could well conclude that most of the received body
of material taught and understood under the traditional title
"equity" will serve the needs of lawyers in the last quarter of this
century inadequately. A realistic, modern equity should take the
place of much of the profession's present concepts of equity to pro-
vide the theoretical and pragmatic foundations for dealing with
emerging issues. As our society evolves, bureaucracy becomes in-
creasingly prominent and the major issue of our time is how best to
protect individual autonomy from the excesses of the social-service
state. The right to ask a judge to exclude another from a particular
piece of earth diminishes in importance as a right to a status or
entitlement increases .3 I hope that Fiss's analysis of the structural
injunction marks the advent of a legal literature on these compli-
cated problems that have until recently been neglected.
21 Id. at 36.
1* See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 Hv.
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Although they should not interfere with an author's plenary
prerogative to write his own book, reviewers perpetually indulge
their proclivity for narrow carping at the author's expense, and this
reviewer is no exception. Legal prescriptions often follow ideological
diagnoses, and Fiss's liberalism shapes his attitude toward struc-
tural injunctions. "Law," wrote Morton Horwitz about a decisive
period in American legal history, "is no longer merely an agency for
resolving disputes; it is an active, dynamic means of social control
and change. '32 While Fiss perceives the structural injunction as an
agency to mollify the abuses of a social-service state, and thus
adopts an attitude similar to that expressed by Horwitz, I think that
a remedy should be subjected as little as possible to the ideological
sympathies of a particular era. Conservatives may one day exter-
minate civil rights structural injunctions just as liberals once dis-
armed labor injunctions. Moreover, liberals should formulate
broader goals than the mere amelioration of hardship and the hu-
manization of treatment in prisons and mental hospitals; civilizing
society with structural injunctions may degenerate into papering
over cracks, keeping social tensions from surfacing as political ex-
pression, and ignoring the underlying sources of injustice, discon-
tent, and racial and economic inequality.
In deciding whether to enjoin, judges consider whether a plain-
tiff possesses an adequate remedy at law or whether his injury is
irreparable in terms of money damages. This practice creates the
remedial hierarchy that, after the development of the structural
injunction, is the second major focus of Fiss's book. Fiss correctly
assails the remedial hierarchy, 33 particularly the irreparable-injury
prerequisite expressed in Younger v. Harris .3 (Indeed, in an earlier
article he criticized the Younger opinion's reliance on antiquated
and superficial notions of federalism.35 ) The maxims of equity ex-
press wise policies about the legal process, but policy can ossify into
clich6, and clich6 can impede the operation of a rational remedial
mechanism.3' This is especially likely since views about adequacy
and irreparability are closely linked to variable attitudes about sub-
stantive standards and judicial activism. Let us examine the
adequacy-irreparability requirement to determine whether it con-
2 M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 155 (1977).
Fiss at 84-85.
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (denying injunctive relief in federal court when a state prosecution
was pending). See Fiss at 63.
u Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1118 (1977).
m' See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 996 (1965) (equita-
ble fictions).
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tinues to serve a useful purpose.
The court system is the crucible of government. Most people
comply with the law as promulgated by a legislature or an appellate
court. But if recalcitrants decline to obey precedent or statute, legis-
latures and appellate courts pass enforcement to trial courts. Trial
judges use remedy to transform legal abstractions into practical
policy. An injunction is one method of enforcing a plaintiff's sub-
stantive entitlement; and it may personalize a constitutional, con-
tract, tort, or criminal law duty expressed universally by a legisla-
ture or appellate court.
Scholars often perceive the judicial process as more than a
method of enforcing particular entitlements; they tend to view it as
a means of creating and expressing public policy. In so doing, how-
ever, they ignore something practicing lawyers know: the court sys-
tem normally enforces only those public policies we already have.
Thus, when a creditor obtains a judgment to utilize certain collec-
tion techniques, or a farmer secures an injunction to prevent a road
contractor from driving earth-moving equipment across his fields,
neither the judgment nor the injunction enforces itself. Scholars
stress the policy-making aspects of Brown but ignore the fact that
no single injunction issuing from the Brown decision succeeded in
desegregating schools in the Deep South. That required a lengthy
series of subsequent individualized, specific injunctions.37
Nevertheless, courts do attempt to use injunctions to express
public policy, and two important procedural consquences follow
from such expressions. First, the court's will is effectuated both
without the consultation of a jury and by means of coercive enforce-
ment. Instead of summoning a jury to decide most issues of injunc-
tive relief, the court system excludes the public; the plaintiff's sub-
stantive 'right is apparently so important that judges refuse to en-
trust it to a jury. This resembles the law side's directed verdict: even
where the seventh amendment mandates a jury, the judge's defer-
ence to the jury often varies indirectly with the possible conse-
quences the judge attaches to an incorrect jury decision. The judge
directs a verdict in a particular trial to preserve the integrity of the
substantive law38 and to circumvent biased factfinding. A ruling
that plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law in a group of contro-
versies represents a more generalized decision to prevent jurors from
37 For a description of how structural injunctions are administered over time in ways that
generate such a series, see Fiss at 36-37.
Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 903, 907 (1971).
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finding facts and formulating remedies.
Second, instead of enforcing a decision for the plaintiff imper-
sonally by sending the sheriff to seize the defendant's property, a
judge enforces an equitable order against a refractory defendant
personally. Courts use contempt to secure for equity's suitors the
means to enjoy what the substantive law guarantees. A statement
that money damages are inadequate in a class of controversies
means that in those cases judges will prevent people from impinging
upon certain substantive rights and paying damages. The
adequacy-irreparability requirement thus serves to identify those
cases in which the plaintiffs entitlement is too important either to
submit to possible jury nullification or to be "bought up" by a
paying defendant. This is what courts mean when they say that a
jury trial for damages is inadequate because the injury is irrepara-
ble.
Normally, if a decision to enjoin means that a plaintiffs right
is too important to allow a defendant to thwart it and pay, then
society, through judges, says that some things are too important to
value in money. An example will demonstrate this point. Walker v.
City of Birmingham3 grew out of a decision by civil rights activists
to ignore an Alabama circuit court injunction proscribing marches
through Birmingham on Good Friday and Easter Sunday, 1963.
Several marchers were charged with criminal contempt. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that those who violate an injunction
cannot defend themselves against a charge of contempt by arguing
that the injunction is unconstitutional. This ruling prevented the
civil rights leaders from asserting that their violation of the injunc-
tion was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Natural-law and legal-realist views confront one another in the
Supreme Court opinion. The majority held that even the civil rights
leaders must adhere to the injunction's apparently correct temporal
authority, 0 but the Court included (as an appendix) a public state-
ment of the activists, who insisted that they would obey the law but
not Alabama circuit court injunctions."
We had a heated class session discussing Walker's political and
social setting, what the rule implies, and whether the exceptions for
substantive high-handedness 4 2 and procedural overreaching" are
3, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). For general background, see A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, THE TRIAL
OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974).
" 388 U.S. at 320-21.
' Id. at 323-24 (appendix B).
4 See id. at 315.
" See id. at 318.
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justified and workable. Toward the end, I reminded a realist student
that the city of Birmingham had posted a $2,500 bond. I said, "If
you represented the ministers, would you tell them that the injunc-
tion was wrong, but that they should cancel the Good Friday and
Easter marches and recover the injunction bond?" The students felt
that my question was a bad joke, and not even those who had argued
in favor of the majority felt the need to respond rationally. That
day's discussion demonstrated to me how ludicrous it is to suggest
that Martin Luther King might have traded his right to march
against segregation in Birmingham for $2500 of the city's money.
The lesson applies to plaintiffs as well as defendants: a society that
posits basic rights cannot allow people to interfere with others'
rights and simply pay for the harm done. Courts must enjoin at
times to preserve the moral imperative of substantive rights.
The moral adequacy of monetary relief is not, however, the sole
element a court considers in deciding whether to enjoin. Judges also
have process reasons for asking whether money awards would be
adequate to preserve particular values. On the one hand, the money
remedy is easier to administer. When the clerk enters the judgment,
the judge's duty almost always ends. If necessary, the sheriff levies
a writ of execution on the judgment debtor's property; and even in
the collection process, courts and legislatures prefer that the credi-
tor exhaust the impersonal execution process before resorting to
personal collection measures." In personam relief is delicate, time-
consuming, and expensive. Coercive enforcement may also be messy
because the people involved are often not the most pliable members
of the human race .45 The factual questions involved are intractable,
turning on motive, ability, and intent; and incorrect factfinding
may result in the imprisonment of someone in an effort to coerce the
impossible."
On the other hand, adjudicating rights, formulating an equita-
ble remedy, and enforcing the remedy blend into one another; and
in a lawsuit that may last for years, the system seeks judicial conti-
nuity, expertise, and flexibility. Jurors go home after the trial,
whereas a judge can retain jurisdiction and review the progress of
the parties in carrying out injunctive relief for a sustained period.
There is also an element of elitism involved; where the schools are
segregated, we exclude the jury because even with summary judg-
" See 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 28 (1940); H. McCUN-
TOCK, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 210 (2d ed. 1948).
" See, e.g., Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957).
" Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 272 (1971).
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ments and directed verdicts, we fear the same pressures that segre-
gated the schools will keep them segregated.
A finding that money damages would be inadequate commits
a judge to the issuance of an injunction, and issuing an injunction
raises the possibility that the judge will have to charge a party with
contempt. This possibility of a contempt judgment also enters into
a judge's decision whether to enjoin. A remedy for the breach of an
injunction should advance the injunction's substantive purpose.17
Courts enjoin only when the defendant should not be allowed to
flout the plaintiff's rights and then pay the plaintiff for the harm
suffered. The remedy for disobeying an injunction should advance
this substantive standard and the policies behind the general refusal
to enjoin when a plaintiff possesses an adequate damage remedy.
Courts have developed two types of contempt, civil and crimi-
nal. Since there are also two subtypes of civil contempt, coercive
and compensatory, there appear to be three branches of contempt
in all. Through compensatory contempt, the defendant pays the
plaintiff what the breach cost the plaintiff; through coercive con-
tempt, the judge, to achieve compliance, fines or imprisons or
threatens to fine or imprison the defendant; and through criminal
contempt, the judge punishes the defendant to vindicate the public
interest in securing obedience to judicial orders. Do contempt judg-
ments advance the substantive and remedial purposes of the injunc-
tions they enforce?
Neither criminal nor compensatory contempt allows a plaintiff
to enjoy his substantive rights, since both are retrospective, occur-
ring after the defendant has violated those rights. Criminal con-
tempt is no more effective in preserving substantive rights, since its
purpose is to convey to the public the message that court orders
must be obeyed. Furthermore, a compensatory contempt judgment
admits a certain degree of failure by directing the contemnor to pay
the plaintiff money, the remedy previously considered inadequate.
Since criminal and compensatory contempt do not adequately safe-
guard a plaintiff's sustantive rights, judges should resort to criminal
and compensatory contempt only when it is too late to coerce.
Coercive contempt is not really an equitable sanction, but more
analogous to the law's writ of execution. It seeks to achieve conduct
by altering incentives, putting the screws on the defendant to per-
mit the plaintiff to exijoy the actual right. The judge fines or threat-
ens to fine and jails or threatens to jail in a calibrated fashion to
47D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 1.2 (1973).
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create an incentive to obey. Actually, a coercive contempt judgment
pursuant to an injunction is analogous to a second injunction with
the penalty specified, because the judge is simply stating the first
injunction in modified terms and restating the consequence of fail-
ing to comply. 8 The contemnor is often said to control the jailhouse
keys, and may avoid the sanction completely by obeying the injunc-
tion; but as with threats to retaliate generally, the threatener hopes
that the threatened will cooperate and that it will prove unnecessary
to carry out the promise.
Coercive contempt is the way courts secure for the winner the
benefit of victory. By resisting enforcement, a contemnor may focus
our attention on how firmly we adhere to substantive policy and the
decision that the plaintiff's remedy at law is inadequate. Whether
the judge possesses the nerve to administer coercive contempt is
relevant to whether the judge should enjoin at the outset, for to
enjoin but to refuse to coerce puts a premium on recalcitrance and
dilutes the plaintiff's substantive right.
Thus, I think that courts have practical administrative and
process reasons for declining to enjoin and remitting a suitor to
damages. They acknowledge these reasons by stating the require-
ment that the remedy at law must be inadequate. If judges adminis-
ter the requirement in light of society's aspirations and its underly-
ing policies, the adequacy prerequisite is salutary. This may be a
roundabout way of saying I disagree with Fiss's contentions that
injunctions are at the bottom of a remedial hierarchy. In fact, courts
already appear to be making the injunctive decison on a case-by-
case basis similar to the way that Fiss contends they should. The
difference is that the criteria that courts use in making their case-
by-case evaluations are rooted in process, rather than substantive,
considerations. Fiss chooses to ignore this aspect of the injunctive
mechanism, and instead posits the existence of a remedial hier-
archy.
In addition to his attack on the adequacy-irreparability require-
ment, Fiss assails another theory he believes partially responsible
for the view that injunctions are a generally disfavored remedy-the
doctrine of prior restraint. The doctrine places a burden on injunc-
tions against speech by insisting that for an injunction to issue, the
speech must not only be unprotected, but must also be unprotected
in "some dramatic, clear and special way."49 In effect, the doctrine
creates a remedial double standard by subjecting injunctions re-
stricting speech to a more severe test of validity than other legal
See Fiss at 36-37.
Id. at 40 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
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regulations of speech, such as criminal statutes and tort-liability
rules °.5 Elsewhere I have maintained that the phrase "prior re-
straint" results in much imprecision of analysis and tends to ob-
scure rather than clarify. 5' Fiss adds an additional count to the
indictment of prior-restraint rubric by arguing that traditional ana-
lyis also fails to distinguish injunctions from sanctions. Fiss redi-
rects us into proper channels by treating an injunction not as a type
of sanction, but as a legal tool more comparable to a statute that
establishes a standard, and by comparing only the ensuing con-
tempt judgment to the criminal sanction. Thus, calling an injunc-
tion a prior restraint which freezes speech, and calling a criminal
prosecution a subsequent punishment which merely chills speech,
is a false distinction because contempt after violation of an injunc-
tion is no more prior than a criminal prosecution.2
I maintain that courts should cease using the phrase "prior
restraint" in determining whether injunctions violate the first
amendment. The proper inquiries are what procedure is necessary
to assure that the issues are fully considered, and whether the order
is phrased to avoid impinging on constitutionally protected con-
duct. There are two reasons to treat injunctions differently from tort
duties and criminal statutes: the procedure followed to secure in-
junctions is juryless and may be ex parte, and the court adjudicating
a contemnor's charged violation may wield the Walker rule to forbid
substantive arguments against the injunction. These considerations
justify careful analysis of the procedure leading up to injunctions
and scrutiny of the content of injunctions, but they do not justify
invoking what has become the obscurity and imprecision of the
prior-restraint doctrine.
Much of this book review has dealt with injunctions in a context
of relatively recent social movements concerning such issues as free
speech, civil rights, and labor. This may convey the erroneous im-
pression that the debate over the proper workings and objectives of
injunctions is a recent development; indeed, the earlier discussion
of the structural injunction may have tended to demonstrate that
it was solely a contemporary phenomenon. We should note in pass-
ing, however, that the structural injunction may not be entirely
new. In early England, equity's original jurisdiction allowed the
oppressed to evade their immediate overlords and to address the
" Fiss at 40.
51 See Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial: Restrictive Orders After Nebraska Press, 67
Ky. L.J. 867, 895-900 (1979).
52 See Fiss at 70.
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sovereign conscience. The chancellor redressed the grievances of
those deemed too weak and powerless to receive justice in the
common-law courts. 3 Any analogy from a feudal society with the
chancellor's centralizing facility to the late twentieth-century
United States will be imperfect. A federal judge, at the behest of a
black plaintiff, ordering Alabama officials to obey the national gov-
ernment's law acts, however, on the same premise as those early
chancellors.54
However novel, structural injunctions are unquestionably ar-
chetypes of judicial activism. Typically, a federal judge importuned
by those who lack alternative means of access to the corridors of
power thwarts the popular will as expressed by a state or local
government. Summoning affirmative conduct from the erstwhile
managers, the judge commands resources and undertakes to super-
vise the details of management himself. Critics express reservations
about both the results and the fluid nature of the process, but they
tend to overlook the importance of the constitutional rights in-
volved, the role of courts in the educational process of politics, and
our society's quest for justice. Fiss closes The Civil Rights
Injunction with this sentence: "Shrouded in the mantle of the Con-
stitution, dedicated to the reasoned elaboration of our communal
ideals, courts have a unique capacity to create the terms of their
own legitimacy. '5
I must add in counterpoint, however, that structural injunc-
tions must also conform to our concept of limited government as
expressed in doctrines of separation of powers and federalism. In a
day of the social-service state and judicial activism, limitations on
government are primarily procedural: before courts act, they feel
compelled only to notify affected people and extend an invitation
to participate. A court order compelling anyone who knows about
it to obey interferes with both the legislature's power to create gen-
eral rules of conduct and the defendant's right to a trial by jury." If
these generalizations are true for a structural injunction, which will
not be vigorously enforced with contempt, they are perforce true of
preventive injunctions. In a rush to protect and ensure beneficiaries'
53 See F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 5-6 (2d ed. 1936); Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 LAw
Q. REv. 347, 359 (1897).
" See, e.g., Adams v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Ala. 1978).
Fiss at 95.,
51 For an exposition of the ways in which the use of the so-called "community injunc-
tion," for example, extends beyond the limits of equitable power, see Comment, Community




constitutional rights, we should not forget the procedural protec-
tions traditionally used to resolve conflict and prevent interference
with the procedural rights of wrongdoers.
These captious remarks should not detract from Fiss's straight-
forward scholarly prose, fresh perspective, and discerning thought.
He brings us a consistently high level of critical analysis coupled
with forceful moral passion. These features place him in the honor-
able tradition of American equity, a worthy successor to Huston and
Chafee. 5 1 I recommend The Civil Rights Injunction to all who study
and practice the law. In an age of social selfishness and narcissism,
The Civil Rights Injunction may redirect a part of our consciousness
to a more humane understanding of our society and a more vigorous
response to some of its problems.
51 Preeminent examples of these authors' works in the field include C. HUSTON, ENFORCE-
MENT OF DECREES IN EQurry (1915), and Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuITY (1948).
